







We develop and analyze a model of strategic redistricting. Two parties choose optimal
redistricting plans for their respective territory. Parties redistrict before aggregate uncer-
tainty is resolved. We show that in the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate
their opponent’s supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. We show
that the stronger a party gets, the more it segregates. Hence, of the two competing par-
ties, ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one. Finally, we
show that if the district level uncertainty is suﬃciently small, the stronger party chooses
polarizing policies while the weaker party accommodates the stronger party’s supporters.
† We thank Thomas Eisenbach, Thomas Palfrey and Andrea Prat for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation.1. Introduction
Periodically, congressional districts are changed to accommodate regional diﬀerences
in population growth. This process of redistricting is a source of intense conﬂict between
political parties. In this paper, we analyze the redistricting process for the House of
Representatives.
States face few constraints when setting the boundaries of their congressional districts.
Congressional districts must contain the same population and must be contiguous which,
in practice, is a fairly permissive constraint. A well-known example, the 4-th congressional
district in Illinois, combines two disjoint areas through a very narrow strip. If a political
party controls the political institutions of a state, then it has wide latitude in designing a
favorable electoral map.
In our model, one of the parties is in full control of each district. Hence, we ignore
instances where control of a state’s political institutions is divided and redistricting plans
are bipartisan. In some cases, independent commissions rather than individual parties
have control of the redistricting process in this case. Such bipartisan redistricting can be
incorporated into our model by giving parties control of less than 100% of the districts
and interpreting the remainder as an exogenous non-partisan redistricting plan.
In general, parties and diﬀerent agents within parties may evaluate election outcomes
in a variety of ways; incumbents may care about protecting their own seats and others
may want to maximize the number of seats the party gets in the House of Representa-
tives. However, the most important consequen c eo fa ne l e c t i o ni st h a ti td e t e r m i n e sw h i c h
majority will control the House of Representatives. Hence, maximizing the probability of
getting a majority in the House is the most important objective. While other concerns may
play a role, focusing on winning a majority facilitates the modelling of political parties as
unitary actors and reveals the main issues in strategic redistricting.
Parties base their redistricting plans on a one-dimensional voter type; a higher type
indicates a higher probability of voting for party 1. A redistricting plan is an allocation of
voter types to districts. A party’s probability of winning a particular district is a function
of the (post-redistricting) average type in that district and two uncertain state variables;
one that determines how favorable the aggregate conditions are for each party and one that
1determines district-level conditions. Since each party is assumed to control a continuum
of districts, the law of large numbers ensures that the election outcome is a deterministic
function of the redistricting strategy and the aggregate state.
We show that there is a unique equilibrium of the redistricting game. In that equilib-
rium, parties maximize the number of seats they would get if the realization of aggregate
uncertainty is such that both parties get half the seats. We refer to the realization of ag-
gregate uncertainty where both parties get half the seats as the critical state.T h eo p t i m a l
redistricting plan (for party 1) picks a cutoﬀ type and combines voters with types above
the cutoﬀ into uniform districts. Voters with types below the cutoﬀ are maximally segre-
gated into diﬀerent districts. Hence, parties segregate voters with unfavorable types and
combine voters with favorable types. This description of the optimal strategy generalizes
Owen and Grofman’s (1988) well-known bipartisan gerrymander.1
A redistricting plan is biased if one party wins a majority of seats with a vote share
less than 1/ 2.W ed e ﬁn et h ep a r t i s a nb i a sa st h ed i ﬀerence between the smallest vote share
with which party 1 wins the election and 1/ 2. Hence, the election is biased in party 1’s
favor if the bias is negative and in party 2’s favor if the bias is positive.2
To understand our comparative statics results, assume that the two parties face the
same, symmetric distribution of types. Then, the election will be biased in favor of the
party that controls the larger share of districts; the weaker party will choose a more uniform
redistricting plan that yields less segregation. Recall that parties, in equilibrium, maximize
their seat share at the critical state. The weak party needs a large vote share to win and
hence, at the critical state, will have many supporters (favorable types). Therefore, the
weak party can create many relatively balanced“winnable” districts and few “unwinnable”
ones packed with unfavorable types. Therefore, the weak party’s redistricting plan is
relatively uniform. By contrast, the stronger party has a relatively small vote share in
1 When there are two voter types, the optimal strategy is two types of districts, as in the work of Owen
and Grofman.
2 The empirical literature (see, for example, Gelman and King (1990), Cox and Katz (1999)) typically
estimates a vote-seat curve that relates a party’s vote share to its share of seats. This literature deﬁnes
bias as the diﬀerence between .5 and the seat share of a party when its vote share is .5. This deﬁnition
of bias is closely related to ours and given an estimated vote-seat curve it is straightforward to determine
partisan bias as deﬁned here. Our deﬁnition is more appropriate given our focus on the probability of
winning rather than the margin of victory.
2the critical state and therefore must create more unwinnable districts to maximize its seat
share.
The local bias of a redistricting plan is the diﬀerence between the smallest vote share
with which party 1 wins a majority of districts in a territory and 1/ 2. The equilibrium
redistricting plan is locally biased in favor of the party that controls redistricting. The
weaker the party (the smaller the territory it controls) the smaller will be the local bias.
Overall bias is related to local bias: if the election is biased in party 1’s favor, then party
1’s territory will exhibit more bias than party 2’s.3
Cox and Katz (2002) provide evidence on the evolution of bias after Republican and
Democratic redistricting plans between 1946 and 1970. This period encompasses the re-
districting revolution (triggered by Supreme Court decisions starting with Baker vs Carr
(1962)) which the authors argue greatly strengthened the Democratic party. Their results
indicate that the pre-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans’ biases were much larger
than the post-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans’ biases while the opposite holds
for Democratic redistricting plans. This ﬁnding is consistent with our model’s predictions.
Consider, again, the case in which parties control equal size territories and face the
same symmetric distribution of voter types. The symmetry ensures that the election
will be unbiased. However, in each territory, the local bias favors the party in charge
of redistricting. We show that even this local bias disappears as the local uncertainty
goes away. That is, if the party that has the higher expected vote share in a particular
district is virtually certain to win that district, then the local bias is virtually zero. Hence,
asymmetry in voter support or party strength is necessary for generating bias and without
this asymmetry, local uncertainty is necessary for local bias.
W ea l s oe x a m i n eh o wt h et y p ed i s t r ibution in a party’s territory aﬀects its electoral
prospects. For example, suppose party 1’s supporters are easier to identify or easier to
segregate than party 2’s supporters. This could be due to geographic concentration of
party 1 supporters or because party 1’s support is correlated with some observable variables
such as ethnicity. We show that if parties are otherwise in a symmetric situation, then the
election will be biased in party 2’s favor. The ability to identify a party’s own supporters is
3 This result assumes homogenous populations and symmetric distributions of types.
3less valuable than the ability to identify the opponent’s supporters: recall that the optimal
redistricting plan requires segregating opponent’s supporters and pooling the party’s own
supporters and hence better identifying the party’s own supporters has little value since
these supporters will be pooled into uniform districts.
Examining Democratic and Republican parties’ safe districts provides indirect evi-
dence of asymmetries in their ability to segregate voters. In the 2000 presidential election,
the smallest Democratic vote share in any congressional district was 24% while there were
24 districts with a Democratic vote share of over 80% and 5 Districts with a Democratic
vote share of over 90%.
Finally, we examine how redistricting plans aﬀect policy choice. We introduce a
policy choice to our redistricting game. The policy is one-dimensional; party 1 supporters
prefer higher policies while party 2 supporters prefer lower policies. Therefore, party 1
polarizes the electorate if it chooses a high policy while a low policy choice by party 1
has a moderating eﬀect. Conversely, party 2 polarizes if it chooses a low policy and has
am o d e r a t i n ge ﬀect with a high policy. Parties ﬁrst choose a redistricting plan and then,
after observing the redistricting plan of the opponent, choose a policy. We show that,
when local uncertainty is small or when the stronger party is suﬃciently strong, the strong
party will choose the most polarizing policy while the weak party will choose the most
moderating policy.
To understand this result, suppose a single party is in control of all redistricting and
policy. Then, there is an obvious beneﬁt to polarization: it further diﬀerentiates voter types
and makes redistricting more eﬀective. This eﬀect gives the stronger party the incentive
to polarize. The eﬀect of polarization is more subtle when polarization increases both the
party’s and its opponent’s ability to segregate. We show that for a given redistricting plan,
when local uncertainty is small or one party has a suﬃciently large advantage, polarization
helps the strong party and hurts the weak party.
Notice that parties in our model have no policy preference. The policy choice simply
maximizes the probability of winning. We show that party positions will tend towards the
position favored by the stronger party’s supporters despite the fact that parties do not
care about policy and policy choice has zero net eﬀe c to nv o t es h a r e s .
41.1 Related Literature
Our work builds on Owen and Grofman (1988). Their model can be interpreted as a
special case of ours with two voter types and one party controlling all districts. For that
case, Owen and Grofman show that the optimal plan creates two types of districts, ones
that overwhelmingly favor the opponent and others that the party is expected to win.4
Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) and Friedman and Holden (2006) characterize the
redistricting plans that maximize a party’s expected number of seats. Friedman and Holden
(2006) consider a setup in which not only the average type but the entire distribution of
types aﬀects a party’s probability of winning that district.
Coate and Knight (2006) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (2005) study socially optimal
redistricting plans. Epstein and O’Hallaran (2004) analyze how redistricting can be used
to enhance the welfare of minorities. Shotts (2002), Katz and Grigg (2005), examine the
eﬀect of majority-minority districts. An important constraint in redistricting plans is the
mandate to create and maintain districts with a substantial majority of minority voters.
Such a constraint amounts to a lower bound on segregation. Incorporating this additional
constraint into our model is not diﬃcult. For example, if voters with certain types must
be fully segregated into their own district, then our characterization of equilibrium redis-
tricting plans would apply to the remaining voter types.
Cox and Katz (2002) provide a comprehensive study of redistricting since the reappor-
tionment revolution of the 1960s. Their model (and much of the literature on redistricting)
focuses on the trade-oﬀ between bias and responsiveness. There is also a large empirical
literature that focuses on the so-called seat-vote curve that is generated by various redis-
tricting plans. (See, for example, Gelman and King (1990 and 1994), King and Browning
(1987).
Shotts (2002) and Besley and Preston (2005) model the interaction of redistricting
and policy choice. In Shott’s model, parties are policy motivated and redistrict to move
the median representative closer to their ideal point. Besley and Preston examine the eﬀect
of partisan bias on a party’s responsiveness to swing voters. In their model, parties have
policy preferences but swing voters constrain their extremism. The partisan bias of the
4 For a diﬀe r e n tg e n e r a l i z a t i o no fO w e na n dG r o f m a ns e eS h e r s t y u k( 1 9 9 8 ) .
5electoral map aﬀects this constraint and hence aﬀects policy. The mechanism connecting
policy and redistricting in our model is diﬀerent. In our model, polarizing policies make it
easier to segregate voters and therefore strong parties polarize.
2. Model and Equilibrium
There are two parties, i =1 ,2, each in control of a continuum of districts. The mass
of districts under party 1’s control is λ ∈ (0,1) and the mass of districts under party 2’s
control is 1 − λ. We refer to the districts under party i’s control as i’s territory.
For any voter v, pv is the probability that v votes for party 1 and 1 − pv is the
probability that v votes for party 2. Three factors determine pv:t h e v o t e r ’ s t y p e ωv,
local uncertainty in the voter’s district sd, and aggregate uncertainty s.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w e
assume
pv = 1/ 2 + ωv + sd + s (1)
Let pd denote party 1’s expected vote share in district d and let ωd denote the average
type in district d. Then, equation (1) implies
pd = 1/ 2 + ωd + sd + s
There are many voters in each district and hence the “law of large number” ensures that
party 1 wins a district whenever pd > 1/ 2. Therefore, party 1 wins district d whenever
sd > −zd − s
Local and aggregate uncertainty are independent and parties face the same local uncer-
tainty in each district. Hence, the variables s,sd are independent and every sd has the
same strictly increasing and continuous cumulative L. Since the parties face symmetric
local uncertainty, L is symmetric around zero:
L(−sd)=1− L(sd)
6for all sd ∈ I R.W ea s s u m et h a tZ =[ −1/ 4, 1/ 4] is the support of L.D e ﬁne, zd = ωd + s;
we call zd the district proclivity and ωd the (average) district type. Then, as a function of
t h ed i s t r i c tp r o c l i v i t y ,t h ep r o b a bility that party 1 wins district d is
Pd =1− L(−ωd − s)=1− L(−zd)=L(zd)
Hence, L translates district proclivities into probabilities of winning that district. Clearly,
as pd increases above 1/ 2,i t se ﬀect on Pd diminishes. Thus, we assume that L is strictly
concave on [0, 1/ 4].
When parties make their redistricting decisions, they face both aggregate uncertainty
s ∈ S =[ −1/ 8, 1/ 8]a n dl o c a lu n c e r t a i n t ysd. That is, they do not know the realized values
of these variables. But, they observe voters’ types ω ∈ Ω ⊂ [−1/ 8, 1/ 8]. A party’s task is
to allocate these types (i.e., voters) among a continuum of equal-sized districts; that is, to
choose a district type distribution over their territory.
Let F denote the collection of cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) with mean zero
and support contained in [−1/ 8, 1/ 8]. A redistricting plan is an element, H,o fF and H(x)
represents the share of districts within the party’s territory that have average type ωd no
greater than x. The segregation constraint represents the most dispersed (or segregated)
feasible distribution of district type averages. The cdf F ∈ F is the segregation constraint
for party 1 and the cdf G ∈ F is the segregation constraint for party 2. Any redistricting
plan H is feasible for party 1 (party 2) only if F (G) is a mean preserving spread of H.
Conversely, any H ∈ F such that F (G) is a mean preserving spread of H is a feasible
redistricting plan for party 1 (party 2). We write H0 º2 H if H is a mean-preserving
spread of H0.
To understand these strategy sets, consider the following example: there are two voter
types, −ω and ω. The segregation constraint F is a two point distribution with mass 1/ 2
each at −ω and at ω. Then, party 1 can create districts by combining voters of type −ω
and voters of type ω. This will yield district means ωd with −ω ≤ ωd ≤ ω and therefore
the support of any feasible redistricting plan must be contained in the interval [−ω,ω].
The redistricting plan must satisfy one further restriction: the average voter type (across
7a l ld i s t r i c t s )m u s tb et h es a m ea st h ea v e r a g ev o t e rt y p eo fF and therefore any feasible
redistricting plan must have mean zero.
We say that H is nondegenerate if it has at least two elements in its support; that is,
if 0 <H (x) < 1f o rs o m ex. If the segregation constraint F has a single element in its
support then F itself is the only feasible redistricting plan. We rule out this trivial case
and assume that both parties face a nondegenerate segregation constraint.
In practice, redistricting is done rather infrequently and parties rarely choose their
plans simultaneously. Our analysis is robust to the timing of moves: any sequencing of
redistricting decisions would lead to the same equilibrium outcome as our simultaneous
move game. We have chosen the simultaneous move formulation because it is the simplest.
Parties maximize the probability of winning a majority in the House of Represen-
tatives. The redistricting plan H yields the voting proclivity distribution Hs at state s,
where
Hs(z)=H(z − s)( 2 )
Hence, H0 = H. Since there are a large number of districts and local uncertainty is
independently distributed, the “law of large numbers” ensures that party 1 wins D(Hs)









and therefore party 1 wins the election at state s if ∆(Hs,H0
s) ≥ 1/ 2.H e n c e , p a r t y 1
chooses H to maximize
Pr{s|∆(Hs,H0
s) ≥ 1/ 2}
Party 2 chooses H0 to minimize this probability. Parties do not know s and have full
support beliefs on S. Beyond the full support assumption, the details of the party’s beliefs
(about s)p l a yn or o l ei no u ra n a l y s i sa n dt h e r e f o r ew ed on o ts p e c i f yt h o s eb e l i e f s .
8A redistricting game is a quadruple Λ =( F,G,λ,L), where F, G are the redistricting
constraints of party 1 and 2 respectively, λ is the size of party 1’s territory, and L is the
cumulative distribution of local uncertainty. When the choice of L is clear, we also omit
L.
2.1 An Example with No Local Uncertainty
To illustrate the model, consider the redistricting game Λ =( F,G,λ,L∞)w h e r e
L∞(z)=
(1i f z>0
1/ 2 if z =0
0i f z<0
(3)
Hence, there is no local uncertainty; the party that has the higher expected vote share
wins the district for sure. Note that L∞ does not satisfy our assumptions. However, it
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by functions that do satisfy them.5 Using L∞
simpliﬁes the equilibrium calculations for thise x a m p l e . T h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fv o t e r s ,
Ω = {−1/ 8, 1/ 8} and both segregation constraints (F,G) assign probability 1/ 2 to each of the
two possible types. Party 1 controls two-thirds of the districts, i.e., λ = 2/ 3.
Suppose that party 1 were to construct two kinds of districts in its territory; unfa-
vorable districts “packed” solely with party 2 supporters (i.e., types ω = −1/ 8)a n dm i x e d
districts that it expects to win. Since party 1 controls 2/ 3 of the electoral map, if the
share of the favorable districts in its own territory is above 3/ 4,t h e ni tw i n sm o r et h a n
2/ 3 · 3/ 4 = 1/ 2 of all districts and therefore wins the election. Conversely, to win the election
without winning any districts in party 2’s territory, party 1 must win at least 3/ 4 of its own
districts. To create a 3/4 proportion of favorable districts, party 1 must combine all of
party 1’s supporters with half of the party 2 supporters: 1/ 2 · 1/ 2 + 1/ 2 = 3/ 4.T h ea v e r a g e
type in these mixed districts will be
ωd = −1/ 3 · 1/ 8 + 2/ 3 · 1/ 8 = 1/ 24
5 For example, the following sequence of functions converges to L∞.F o rz ∈ Z,
Ln(z)=
(1/ 4 + z)n
(1/ 4 + z)n +( 1/ 4 − z)n
9Hence, party 1 will win the election as long as s>−1/ 24 and therefore, party 1’s equilibrium
payoﬀ is at least Pr{s>−1/ 24}.
Note that there is no strategy for party 1 that enables it to win 3/ 4 of the districts in
its territory when s<−1/ 24. On the other hand, by creating uniform districts, party 2 can
insure that it wins its entire territory whenever s<0. Therefore, party 2 can guarantee
winning the election whenever s<−1/ 24. Thus, party 2’s equilibrium payoﬀ is no less than
Pr{s ≤− 1/ 24}.I tf o l l o w st h a tt h ee q u i l i b r i u mp a y o ﬀ of party 1 must be Pr{s>−1/ 24} and
the equilibrium payoﬀ of party 2 must be Pr{s ≤− 1/ 24}. Moreover, the party 1 strategy
described above and the uniform redistricting plan for party 2 constitute an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, both parties choose a redistricting plan that maximizes their seat share
at s = −1/ 24, i.e., the state at which the election is tied. It is easy to verify that the
equilibrium strategy of party 1 is unique. However, at s = −1/ 24 party 2 can choose other
redistricting plans and still win all districts in its territory and hence there are multiple
equilibrium strategies for party 2 in this example. The strict increasingness of L (i.e., local
uncertainty) rules out this multiplicity in Theorem 1.
We show in Theorem 1 below that party 1’s equilibrium strategy fully segregates
all districts below some critical type ω and create a mass of uniform districts with the
same average x>ω . Hence, below ω the redistricting plan coincides with the segregation
constraint while above ω all remaining types are combined into a uniform district. To
formally deﬁne such strategies, we will need the following notation. For any cdf H and
p ∈ (0,1), let H
p
+ be the distribution of the upper 1 − p-percentile, i.e.,
H
p






We write m(H)f o rt h em e a no fH.
Deﬁnition: The p−segregation plan for party 1 with constraint F is the distribution





F(x) if F−1(p) >x
p if F−1(p) ≤ x<m (F
p
+)
1 if x ≥ m(F
p
+)
10for p ∈ (0,1) and F0 yields m(F) for sure.
To illustrate p−segregation strategies, ﬁrst consider a discrete example with three
types, Ω = {−1/8,0,1/8}.L e t F be such that −1/8a n d1 /8 have probability .25 each
and 0 has probability .5. Then F0.4 has support {−1/8,0,5/96} and yields −1/8w i t h
probability .25, 0 with probability .15 and 5/96 with probability .6.









Types that favor party 1 are unfavorable for party 2 and hence a p−segregation
plan for party 2 fully segregates all districts above some critical ω and creates a mass
of uniform districts with the same average below ω. For any distribution H,l e tρ(H)
denote the corresponding distribution of −x.T h a t i s , ρ(H) is the unique distribution
such that ρ(H)(x)=1−H(−x)a te v e r yc o n t i n u i t yp o i n to fρ(H).6 If G is the segregation
constraint for party 2 then ρ(G)i st h et r a n s l a t i o no fG that makes G comparable to F,t h e
segregation constraint of party 1. If ρ(G)=F then both parties face the same segregation
constraint.
Deﬁnition: The p−segregation plan for party 2 with constraint G is the distribution
¯ Gp := ρ[ρ(G)p].
6 Note that ρ(ρ(H)) = H and hence ρ−1 = ρ.
11For the segregation constraint in example above with three types Ω = {−1/8,0,1/8}
the distribution ¯ G0.4 has support {−5/96,0,1/8}. The probability of −5/96 is .6, the
probability of 1/8i s.25, and the probability of 0 is .15.
Theorem 1 establishes that the equilibrium is unique and that equilibrium strategies
are p−segregation strategies.
Theorem 1: (i) There exist p,q such that (Fp, ¯ Gq) is the unique equilibrium of Λ =
(F,G,λ,L). (ii) In equilibrium, parties maximize their vote shares at the unique s∗ that
solves ∆(Fp
s , ¯ Gq
s)=1/ 2.
Theorem 1 shows that a single parameter characterizes a party’s optimal strategy.
Henceforth, we identify equilibrium strategies with the pair (p,q). We refer to the state of
aggregate uncertainty at which the election is tied in the unique equilibrium as the critical
state and write s(Λ) for the critical state in game Λ.7
Parties’ redistricting plans maximize their seat shares at the critical state. To see why,




s∗)=1/ 2 < ∆(Hs∗, ¯ G
q
s∗) for some feasible
H.B yc o n t i n u i t y ,∆(Hˆ s, ¯ G
q
ˆ s)=1/ 2 for some ˆ s<s ∗. Then, with strategy H,p a r t y1w i n s
the election in all s>ˆ s and hence H yields a higher payoﬀ for party 1 than Fp.
We can provide a simpler description of party 1’s optimal redistricting plan when F
has a density f>0a n dL is diﬀerentiable. Let s∗ be the critical state and note that Fs∗
is the most segregated distribution of voting proclivities at s∗.L e tf∗ denote the density






to be the expected proclivity conditional on the proclivity being above y. Then, party 1’s
optimal strategy is the p−segregation strategy such that p =
R





7 Since L(z) ≤ 1/ 2 whenever z ≤ 0 it follows that D(Hs) ≤ 1/ 2 if s = −1/ 8 and D(Hs) ≥ 1/ 2 if s = 1/ 8 for
all H ∈ F.S i n c eL is continuous and strictly increasing throughout its support, ∆(F
p
s , ¯ G
q
s) is continuous








The optimal strategy is the p−segregation strategy such that the corresponding y,zy satisfy
the tangency condition (4) illustrated in Figure 2.
3. Bias and Segregation
In this section, we analyze how changing the redistricting game’s parameters aﬀects
equilibrium outcomes. The main result is that changes that favor party i lead to party i
segregating more and party j 6= i segregating less. A parameter change in the redistricting
game Λ makes party i stronger if it allows i to win over a larger set of states. That is,
party 1 becomes stronger if the critical state, s(Λ) ,f a l l sa n dp a r t y2b e c o m e ss t r o n g e ri f
s(Λ)r i s e s .
Deﬁnition: Let Λ =( F,G,λ,L) and ˆ Λ =( ˆ F, ˆ G, ˆ λ,L).W e s a y p a r t y 1 [party 2] is
stronger in Λ than in ˆ Λ if s(Λ) <s (ˆ Λ)[ s(Λ) >s (ˆ Λ)].
Although the probability distribution over the aggregate uncertainty (“states”) plays
no role in our analysis, it does aﬀect a party’s probability of winning. If the probability
distribution over states remains constant, then increasing a parties strength increases its
probability of winning. However, our analysis remains valid even if the probability distribu-
tion over states changes as other parameters change. In that case, a party’s strength refers
to its ability to win in unfavorable circumstances and not to its probability of winning.
13Note that q>pimplies Hp º2 Hq and ¯ Hp º2 ¯ Hq;i n c r e a s i n gp yields a mean
preserving spread of the type distribution. Theorem 2 shows that as a party becomes
stronger, the optimal p increases. Hence, the stronger a party gets the more it segregates.
Theorem 2: Let Λ =( F,G,λ), ˆ Λ =( F, ˆ G, ˆ λ) and let p, ˆ p be the corresponding equilib-
rium strategies of party 1.I fp a r t y1 is stronger in Λ than in ˆ Λ,t h e np ≥ ˆ p.
Proof: See Appendix.
Consider the simple extreme case with almost no local uncertainty; that is, assume
that the function L is close to L∞ as deﬁned in the example of Section 2.1. Since party
1 wins for sure any district with proclivity above 1/ 2, it maximizes the number of districts
with proclivity just above 1/ 2 at the critical state. A symmetric statement holds for party
2. Now, assume that party 1 is stronger than party 2 and hence the critical state is less
than 1/ 2. I fp a r t y2c h o o s e sau n i f o r mr e d i s t r i c t i n gp l a n( q = 0), then since the average
proclivity is less than 1/ 2,i tw i n sall seats in its territory. Obviously, this implies that
a uniform redistricting plan is optimal for the weaker party. By contrast, party 1 must
segregate voters to win any seats in the critical state. Moreover, a lower critical state
implies that party 1 must “give up” more seats and hence choose a larger p.
Theorem 2 shows that this insight holds even with local uncertainty. To gain fur-
ther intuition for Theorem 2, assume the segregation constraint F has support {−ω,ω}
and F(−ω)=1/ 2. Then, the optimal redistricting plan creates two types of districts: a
p−fraction of districts will contain only types −ω and the remaining 1 − p−fraction will
contain a mixture of types with average z∗ =
p
1−pω.( N o t et h a tp ≤ 1/ 2). At the critical
state s∗,w eh a v e
L0(z∗ + s∗)=
L(z∗ + s∗) − L(−ω + s∗)
z∗ + ω
(5)
A stronger party 1 means a lower critical state. Fixing z∗ and decreasing s∗ makes the left
hand side of (5) larger than the right hand side. Conversely, ﬁxing s∗ and increasing z∗
makes the right hand larger than the left hand side. Hence, for (5) to hold after a decrease
in s∗, z∗ must increase and hence p must increase. That is, p increases as party 1 gets
stronger.
14A party’s share of all votes in state s is s + 1/ 2. This follows since the variables
ωd (average type in each district) and sd (local uncertainty) both have zero mean. The
r e d i s t r i c t i n gg a m ei sb i a s e di np a r t y1 ’ sf a v o ri fi tn e e d sl e s st h a nh a l fo ft h ev o t e st ot i e
the election. That is, the bias of a redistricting game is s(Λ). The game Λ is biased in
party 1’s favor if s(Λ) < 0a n di np a r t y2 ’ sf a v o ri fs(Λ) > 0. We say that Λ is more biased
than Λ0 if |s(Λ)| > |s(Λ0)|.H e n c e ,i fs(Λ) < 0( > 0), then party 1 (2) can win the election
even though a majority of voters prefer party 2 (1) and therefore the election is biased in
party 1’s (2’s) favor.
The bias in territory i is deﬁned analogously. Let
s1(Λ): ={s|D(Fp
s )=1/ 2}
s2(Λ): ={s|D( ¯ Gq
s)=1/ 2}
where (Fp, ¯ Gq)i st h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mo fΛ. Hence, si(Λ)i st h ev o t es h a r et h a tw o u l d
yield a tie in territory i. Arguments analogous to the ones made for s(Λ) ensure that si(Λ)
is also well deﬁned.
Theorem 3 below establishes that the local bias always favors the redistricting party.
Also, it shows that the local bias increases when the redistricting party becomes stronger.
Finally, Theorem 3 shows that bias grows as the strong party gets stronger.
Theorem 3: (i) For any Λ, s1(Λ) ≤ 0 ≤ s2(Λ) and s1(Λ) ≤ s(Λ) ≤ s2(Λ). (ii) Let
Λ =( F,G,λ), ˆ Λ =( F, ˆ G, ˆ λ).I fs(Λ) ≤ s(ˆ Λ),t h e ns1(Λ) ≤ s1(ˆ Λ). (iii) The critical state
s(F,G,λ) is decreasing in λ.
Proof: See Appendix.
Theorem 3 relies on two key observations: let α(s)b et h ep that maximizes the
seat share of party 1 in its territory in state s, D(Fp
s ). In Theorem 2, we showed that
the stronger party 1 is the more it segregates; that is, α is decreasing in s. The second
observation is that ﬁxing s,a sp increases towards its optimal level, the seat share increases;
that is, D(Hp
s)i si n c r e a s i n ga tp ≤ p∗.
Let s = s(Λ)a n ds1 = s1(Λ). First, assume that s<0. Since s<0, party 2 must
win more than half of the seats in its territory. (For example, a uniform redistricting plan
15would yield more than half of the seats for party 2.) This, in turn implies that, at s,p a r t y
1 must win more than half of the seats in its territory to yield a tied election. Therefore,
we have
D(Fp
s ) ≥ ∆(Fp
s , ¯ Gq
s)=1/ 2 = D(Fp
s1)
Then, the monotonicity of D and ∆ imply that s1 ≤ s<0. Next, assume s ≥ 0a n d
therefore α(s) ≤ α(0) and
D(F
α(0)
0 ) ≥ D(F
α(s)
0 ) ≥ D(F0
0)=1 /2
The lasts equality follows since at s = 0 a uniform redistricting yields exactly half the seats
for each party. It follows that D(F
α(s)
0 ) ≥ 1/ 2 and s1 ≤ s. Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from
similar arguments.
T h e o r e m s2a n d3o ﬀer testable implications of our model. Increasing party 1’s
strength or bias increases the local bias in territory 1. Cox and Katz (1999) provide
evidence on the evolution of bias after Republican and Democratic redistricting plans be-
tween 1946 and 1970. This period encompasses the redistricting revolution (triggered by
Supreme Court decisions starting with Baker vs Carr (1962)) which the authors argue
greatly strengthened the Democratic party in the sense deﬁned above. Their results (Ta-
ble 3, pg 830) indicate that the pre-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans yielded
larger biases than post-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans while the evolution of
the biases is exactly reversed for Democratic redistricting plans. Cox and Katz deﬁne bias
as the seat share of a party when its vote share is one half. They estimate that the bias of
Republican plans drops from 8.26% to .092% while the bias of Democratic plans increases
from 4.76% to 8.70%. We can use their estimates to compute the estimated bias according
to the deﬁnition used here.8 In that case, the estimated bias for Republican plans drops
from 2.3% to essentially zero while the estimated bias for Democratic plans increases from
1.1% to 2.1%.
Next, we apply the analysis above to redistricting games in which both parties face the
same, symmetric constraint and diﬀer only in the size of their territories. The redistricting
8 Using their estimated seat-vote curve it is straightforward to compute the corresponding estimated
biases as deﬁn e di nt h i sp a p e r .
16game (F,G,λ)i shomogenous if F = G, that is, if both parties face the same redistricting
constraint. We let Λ =( F,λ,L) denote a homogenous redistricting game. Recall that
for any distribution F ∈ F,ρ(F)d e n o t e st h ed i s t r i b u t i o no f−ω. The distribution F is
symmetric if ρ(F)=F.
In a homogenous redistricting game (F,λ) with a symmetric constraint F,b o t hp a r -
ties’ situation is identical except for the sizes of their territories. For this special case,
the following corollary summarizes the comparative statics results of this section. The
election will be biased in favor of the party with the larger territory; the stronger party
will choose a more segregating redistricting plan and generate a more biased electoral map
in its territory.
Corollary 1: Let (p,q) be the equilibrium of the homogenous redistricting game Λ =
(F,λ) and assume that F is symmetric. If λ>1/ 2,t h e n
(i) the election is biased in party 1’s favor;
(ii) p>q , i.e., party 1 segregates more than party 2;
(iii) bias in territory 1 is greater than bias in territory 2.
T h ec o r o l l a r ys h o w sh o w ,i nas y m m e t r i ca n dh o m o g e n e o u se l e c t o r a t e ,t h ep a r t i e s ’
redistricting plans diﬀer in equilibrium. The weaker party favors more uniform redistricting
plans while the stronger party favors creates more lopsided districts.
The comparative statics results of this section can also provide some insight into
how equilibrium redistricting plans diﬀer from ex post seat maximizing redistricting plans.
Suppose a particular state s above the critical state is realized, and party 1 wins the
election. Party 1’s redistricting plan maximizes its seat share at the critical state but
not at s. The optimal redistricting plan at s has less segregation (smaller p) than the
equilibrium plan and, therefore, the districts that party 1 wins will have a larger margin
of victory than would be optimal in the seat maximizing plan. Hence, it may appear as
if party 1 is creating overly safe districts. By contrast, party 2’s redistricting plan will
appear as if it has segregated too little; it’s seat share would increase, had it created more
safe districts.
We conclude this section by examining the limiting case when local uncertainty dis-
appears. Recall that L∞ i nt h ee x a m p l ed e s c r i b e st h es i t u a t ion without local uncertainty.
17Hence, we say that local uncertainty disappears along the sequence Λn =( F,G,λ,Ln)i f
Ln converges pointwise to L∞. Corollary 2 generalizes the example and shows that (1) at
the critical state, the stronger party wins half of all districts despite not winning any dis-
tricts in the opponent’s territory and (2) the weaker party chooses a uniform redistricting
plan as local uncertainty disappears.
Corollary 2: Suppose uncertainty disappears along Λn =( F,G,λ,Ln) and λ>1/ 2.L e t
(pn,qn) be the equilibrium of Λn. Then,
(i) limpn = 2λ−1
2λ and qn =0for all n suﬃciently large.
(ii) lims1(Λn) = lims(Λn) ≥ 1−2λ
2λ and lims2(Λn)=0 .
Part (ii) of Corollary 2 shows that, as λ goes to 1/ 2, even the strong party will choose
uniform redistricting and all biases will be eliminated. Hence, if parties are evenly balanced
and local uncertainty is small then competitive redistricting implies small local biases and
a small overall bias.
4. Changes in the Segregation Constraint
In this section, we study how changes in the segregation constraint aﬀect the equilib-
rium outcome. A mean preserving spread of the segregation constraint relaxes the party’s
constraint and, therefore, must (weakly) increase its seat share in its own territory. Such a
change may come about through better information; that is, greater ability to identify vot-
ers. However, a greater ability to segregate also helps the opponent. Theorem 4 considers
a homogenous redistricting game and shows that when one party’s territory is suﬃciently
larger than its opponents, it beneﬁts from a mean preserving spread of the segregation
constraint.
Theorem 4: Let Λ =( F,λ,L), ˆ Λ =(ˆ F,λ,L) be homogenous redistricting games such
that F º2 ˆ F.S u p p o s e (F,1,L) and ( ˆ F,1,L) do not yield the same equilibrium payoﬀs.
Then, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all λ>λ ∗ party 1 receives a strictly higher
equilibrium payoﬀ in ˆ Λ than in Λ.
Even though the redistricting game is homogenous (hence the two territories have
the same distribution of types) the segregation constraint facing the two parties may be
18asymmetric. For example, assume some supporters of one party are easily identiﬁed by
their ethnicity or their address while there are no comparably reliable indicators of support
for the other party. Asymmetries in the segregation constraint F capture such diﬀerences
between the two parties’ supporters.
Party 2’s supporters are easier to segregate if the distribution party 2 supporters (low
types) is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of party 1 supporters (low types).
Recall that F is symmetric if ρ(F)=F.H e n c e ,i fF is symmetric, both parties’ supporters
are equally diﬃcult to segregate. Suppose F is not symmetric. Deﬁne H ∈ F such that H
coincides with F for ω<0 and is symmetric. Hence, H is the distribution of types that
results if both parties’ supporters have the distribution of party 2 supporters implied by
F.I fH is a mean preserving spread of F then we can conclude that party 2 supporters
are more “spread out” than party 1 supporters and therefore easier to segregate.
Deﬁnition: Party 2 supporters are easier to segregate at F if there is H ∈ F such that
ρ(H)=H, H(ω)=F(ω) for ω<0 and F º2 H.
Example: There are 3 types, Ω = {−1/8,0,1/16} and F puts probability .25 on −1/8;
probability .25 on 0 and probability .5o n1 /16. In this case, party 2 supporters are easier
to segregate because the symmetric distribution H on {−1/8,0,1/8} that puts probability
.25 on −1/8, .5o n0 ,a n d.25 on 1/8 is a mean preserving spread of F.
For US elections, examining the two parties’ safe districts reveals evidence of asym-
metries in their segregation constraints. In the 2000 presidential election, the smallest
Democratic vote share in any congressional district was 24% while there were 24 districts
with a Democratic vote share of over 80% and 5 Districts with a Democratic vote share of
over 90%. This suggests that there are stronger indicators of Democratic voting proclivities
than of Republican voting proclivities.
Theorem 5 examines a situation where both parties control homogenous areas of equal
size. If the redistricting game is symmetric, both parties face the same constraint. In that
case,
s(Λ)=0
19and hence, the symmetric redistricting game is unbiased, i.e., the party with majority
support wins the election. When party 2’s supporters are easier to segregate, the critical
s t a t ei sl e s st h a n1/ 2 and the election is biased in party 1’s favor.
Theorem 5: If party 2’s supporters are easier to segregate in Λ =( F, 1/ 2),t h e ns(Λ) ≤ 0.
Theorem 5 establishes that the equilibrium outcome is biased against the party whose
supporters can be segregated more readily. To understand this result, consider a change
that increases both parties’ ability to segregate party 2’s supporters: this change does not
help party 2 in territory 2 because its equilibrium strategy (the p−segregation strategy)
creates uniform districts of supporters. However, since maximally segregating the oppo-
nent’s supporters is optimal, party 1 beneﬁts from its increased ability segregate party 2’s
supporters.
Theorem 5 can be strengthened to establish a strict inequality (s(Λ) < 0) if the
extreme supporters of party 2 are more extreme than the extreme supporters of party
one. More formally, let ω(F)b et h em i n i m u me l e m e n ti nt h es u p p o r to fF (the strongest
supporter of party 2) and let ¯ ω(F) be the maximum element in the support of F (the
strongest supporter of party 1). If ¯ ω(F) < −ω(F) then party 1 strictly gains from its
greater ability to segregate party 2’s supporters.
5. Redistricting and Polarization
In this section, we analyze the interaction of redistricting plans and policy choices.
Parties ﬁrst choose a redistricting plan and then make a policy choice. We are interested
in why and when a party polarizes; that is, selects a policy that increases the support of
voters who favor the party and decreases support of voters who favor the opponent.
In the redistricting-policy game, voting proclivity z depends on the voter’s type ω ∈
[−x,x], the state s ∈ [−1/ 8, 1/ 8] and the policy choice π1,π 2 ∈ [0, ¯ π]w h e r ex(1 + ¯ π) ≤ 1/ 8.
Let
ξ(ω,π1,π 2,s)=s + ω(1 + π1 − π2)
denote type ω voter’s proclivity given s,π1,π 2.
We can interpret this model as one where voter types ω>0 prefer higher policy
values and voter types ω<0 prefer lower policy values. Types with higher |ω| respond
20more to policy changes than those with lower |ω|. By choosing a higher policy, party 1
is catering to its supporters and alienating party 2’s supporters. Hence, a higher policy
choice is polarizing for party 1 and accommodating for party 2. Note that policy choice has
a limited impact on voting proclivities: irrespective of π1,π 2, positive types favor party 1
if s ≥ 0 and negative types favor party 2 if s ≤ 0.
As above, F (G)i sp a r t y1 ’ s( 2 ’ s )r e d i s t r i c t i n gc onstraint and is a mean preserving
spread of any feasible redistricting plan. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the parties choose a
redistricting plan. In the second stage, the parties observe each others redistricting plans
and choose policies πi ∈ [0, ¯ π]. Then, the state is revealed and in territory i,p a r t y1w i n s
as e a ts h a r eo f
Vi(H,π1,π 2,s)=
Z
L(s + ω(1 + π1 − π2))dH
Party 1 wins if λV1 +( 1− λ)V2 > 1/ 2 and party 2 wins if this inequality is reversed. We
analyze subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
Suppose π1 = π2 and hence the voting proclivity is z = ω+s as in the previous sections.
Let Λ =( F,G,λ) denote the corresponding redistricting game and let (p∗,q∗)d e n o t ei t s
equilibrium. Theorem 6 below considers the case where λ is close to one and hence party
1 controls most districts. In that case, the unique equilibrium is the redistricting plan
(p∗,q∗) and policies π1 = π2 =¯ π. Hence, party 1 chooses the most polarizing policy while
party 2 chooses the most accommodating policy. The equilibrium redistricting plans are
segregation plans as in the previous sections. Hence, an equilibrium of the redistricting-
policy game is a strategy proﬁle of the form ((π1,p),(π2,q)).
Theorem 6: There exists λ∗ < 1 such that for all λ ∈ (λ∗,1] the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the redistricting-policy game is ((1,p ∗),(1,q∗)).
Since increased polarization generates a mean-preserving spread in voting proclivities,
Theorem 4 suggests that polarization would beneﬁtp a r t y1 . H o w e v e r ,s i n c ep o l i c i e sa r e
chosen after redistricting, to prove Theorem 6, we must show that party 2 would not want
to choose a more polarizing policy despite party 1’s inability to adjust its redistricting
plan. We show that for a ﬁxed redistricting plan, more polarization beneﬁts the party that
was in charge of the redistricting. The reason is that at the critical state, districts that
21the redistricting party expects to win are less lopsided than unfavorable districts. Then,
the curvature of L implies that more polarization beneﬁts the redistricting party.
Theorem 7 shows that the conclusions of Theorem 6 hold for all λ 6= 1/ 2 when local
uncertainty is small. Recall that L∞ describes the no local uncertainty limit and hence
uncertainty disappears whenever Ln converges to L∞ pointwise.
Theorem 7: Suppose uncertainty disappears along Πn =( F,G,λ,Ln) and λ>1/ 2.L e t
((πn
1,p n),(πn
2,qn)) be the equilibrium of Πn.T h e n ,
(i) limpn = 2λ−1
2λ and qn =0 , πn
1 = πn
2 =1for all n suﬃciently large.
(ii) lims1(Πn)=l i ms(Πn) ≥ 1−2λ
2λ and lims2(Πn)=0 .
When local uncertainty is small, the election is biased in favor of the party with
the larger territory (party 1). Moreover, the weaker party (party 2) chooses a uniform
redistricting plan. Therefore, polarization cannot beneﬁt the weak party. On the other
hand, the strong party segregates and therefore beneﬁts from polarization.
Theorems 6 and 7 show how redistricting aﬀects policy choice even if parties care only
about their probability of winning the election and are indiﬀerent among all policy choices.
Equilibrium policies shift towards those favored by the supporters of the stronger party.
In our model, policy choices do not aﬀect the average voting proclivity over all districts.
However, extending our model to permit a trade-oﬀ between average proclivity (or vote
share) and polarization is straightforward. Consider the following example: suppose that
there are two voter types (Ω = {−x,x})a n dl e tt h ev o t i n gp r o c l i v i t yz be given by
z = s + ω(1 + π1 − π2) − c(π1 − π2)( 8 )
for c>0. In this case, π1 = π2 = 0 maximizes party i’s vote share. However, for
c<(2λ − 1)x, the equilibrium policies described in Theorem 7 remain an equilibrium.
Hence, party 1 sacriﬁces votes for more polarization while party 2 gives up votes for a
more accommodating policy.
226. Conclusion
We have described how aggregate uncertainty creates a strategic interaction between
parties’ redistricting decisions. This uncertainty ensures that one party’s optimal action
depends on the redistricting plan of the other even though the fraction of districts a
party wins at any particular state s is a separable function of its own and its opponents
redistricting plans. Despite the vital role aggregate uncertainty plays in our analysis,
equilibrium strategies are independent of the distribution of this uncertainty. It follows
that asymmetric information regarding this distribution will have no eﬀect on equilibrium
outcomes.
Our model provides a framework for analyzing the interaction between redistricting
and other decisions. We have considered one such interaction by adding a policy choice
stage to our model. Other decisions such as the allocation of campaign resources across
districts or the policy choices of individual candidates who care only about outcome in
their own district can also be studied within our framework.
7. Appendix
The following is an obvious consequence of the fact that L is strictly increasing.
Lemma 1A: For F,G ∈ F,b o t hD(Fs,G s) and ∆(Fs,G s) are continuous and strictly
increasing functions of s.
Deﬁne, for y ∈ [−1/ 4,0] and z ∈ [0, 1/ 4],
f(y,z)=
½ L(z)−L(y)
z−y if y 6=0o rz 6=0
L0(0) if y = z =0
Recall that L is strictly concave on [0, 1/ 4] and symmetric around 0. These two properties
ensure that L is diﬀerentiable at 0, and therefore f is well-deﬁned. Since L is continuous
and diﬀerentiable at 0, f is also continuous. Furthermore, the strict concavity of L on
[0, 1/ 4]e n s u r e st h a tf o re v e r yy ∈ [−1/ 4,0), there is a unique z ∈ [0, 1/ 4] that maximizes
f(y,·). For y ∈ [−1/ 4,0), let φ(y) be this maximizer and let φ(y)=0f o ry ∈ [0, 1/ 4].
By the theorem of the maximum, φ is continuous on [−1/ 4,0). Below, we show that φ is
nonincreasing and continuous on the entire interval Z =[ −1/4,1/4].
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Let z(F) denote the minimum of the support of F,¯ z(F)d e n o t et h em a x i m u mo ft h e
support of F,a n dF−(y) = limt→y− F(t). For p ∈ [0,1], let




W(p,F)={z(p,F) − φ(y)|y ∈ y(p,F)}
When the choice of F is clear, we drop it and write y(p),z(p), and W(p)i n s t e a d .
A correspondence g from the reals to nonempty subsets of reals is increasing if x ≥ x0,
w ∈ g(x), w0 ∈ g(x0)i m p l i e sw ≥ w0 and is strictly increasing if the second inequality
a b o v ei ss t r i c tw h e n e v e rt h eﬁrst one is strict.
Lemma 2A: φ is (ia) decreasing and φ(y) < −y for y<0 and (ib) continuous. (ii) W
is increasing, y is increasing and both are upper-hemicontinuous (uhc).
Proof: Part (ia) follows from elementary arguments. By (ia), limy→0− φ(y)=0 .H e n c e ,
φ is continuous. Next, we prove (ii). That y is uhc and increasing is obvious. Note that
z(p) is the expectation of F conditional on a realization in the top 1−p−percentile. Hence,
it is a continuous and increasing function. Then, by (ib), the correspondence −φ(y(·)) is
increasing, W i si n c r e a s i n ga n db o t ha r eu h c .
T h en e x tt h r e el e m m a sc h a r a c t e r i z et h es e a tm a x i m i z i n gr e d i s t r i c t i n gp l a na saf u n c -
tion of the state. We do this from party 1’s perspective. Below, we omit the reference to
24party 1, hence we drop the subscript for the party and a p−segregation plan is always a
p−segregation plan for party 1. Deﬁne the following maximization problem:
maxD( ˆ F)s u b j e c t t o ˆ F º2 F (∗)
Lemma 1: For every F ∈ F, the maximization problem (∗) has a unique solution. This
solution F∗ = Fp for some p ∈ [0,1] and F∗(0) ≤ p.
Proof: First, we note that the set { ˆ F ∈ F|ˆ F º2 F} is closed in the topology of weak
convergence. Since F is compact, it follows that the constraint set of (∗) is compact. Since
D is continuous, a solution exists. Next, we will show that this solution is unique and is a
segregation plan.
Step 1: Let g be an uhc correspondence from [x,x0] to nonempty, convex subsets of the
reals. If there is w ∈ g(x),w 0 ∈ g(x0) such that w ≤ 0 ≤ w0 then there exists x∗ ∈ [x,x0]
such that 0 ∈ g(x∗).
Proof: Follows from elementary arguments.
Note that if ¯ z(F) ≤ 0, then the strict convexity of L on [−1/ 4,0] ensures that the
unique solution to (∗)i sF1 and we are done. If z(F) ≥ 0, then the strict concavity of L
on [0, 1/ 4] ensures that the unique solution to (∗)i sF0. So, henceforth it is suﬃcient to
consider F such that ¯ z(F) > 0 >z (F).
Step 2: (i) z(p) > 0 for all p such that 0 ∈ y(p). (ii) Either 0 ∈ W(p∗) for some p∗ ∈ [0,1]
or z(0) >φ (z(F)) and not both. (iii) If the p∗ in (ii) exists, it is unique and z(p∗)=φ(y)
implies y<0.
Proof: P a r t( i )i si m m e d i a t es i n c e¯ z(F) > 0. If z(0) >φ (z(F)), then minW(0) > 0a n d
since W is increasing, w>0f o ra l lw,p such that w ∈ W(p). If z(0) ≤ φ(z(F)), we have
w ≤ 0f o rs o m ew ∈ W(0). Then, choose ˆ p such that 0 ∈ y(ˆ p). Since φ(0) = 0 it follows
that z(ˆ p)−φ(0) > 0 by (i) and therefore maxW(ˆ p) > 0. Then, by Lemma 1A, there exists
p∗ such that 0 ∈ W(p∗). This proves (ii). That p∗ is unique is immediate. Since z(p)i s
increasing and φ(y)i sd e c r e a s i n g ,z(ˆ p) > 0=φ(0), part (iii) follows.
25For any F,l e tpF =0i fm i nW(0) > 0a n dpF = p∗ (as deﬁn e di nS t e p2 )o t h e r w i s e .
Similarly, let yF = z(F)i fm i n W(0) > 0a n dyF =m i n {y ∈ y(p∗)|z(p∗) − φ(y)=0 }
otherwise.
Step 3: FpF is the unique optimal redistricting plan.










>L ∗(z) whenever z<y F
= L∗(z)i f z ∈ {yF,z(pF)}
<L ∗(z) otherwise
(1)
For any cdf ˆ F,l e tB( ˆ F) denote the correspondence
B( ˆ F)(z)=[ˆ F−(z), ˆ F(z)]
Clearly, B( ˆ F) is uhc. Consider any optimal F∗. First, we show that for any z<y F ≤ 0,
F∗(z) ≤ FpF(z)=F(z). To see this suppose F∗(z2) >F pF(z2)f o rs o m ez2 <y F.S i n c e
F∗ º2 F it follows that z2 6= −1/ 4 and there exists z1 <z 2 such that F∗(z1) <F pF(z1).
Hence, by Lemma 1A, there exist w such that ∅ 6= B(F∗)(w) ∩ B(FpF)(w); that is,
there exist w such that F(w) ≥ [FpF]−(w)a n dFpF(w) ≥ [F∗]−(w). Choose any p such






















+ )=D(F∗), contradicting the optimality
of F∗.













































Moreover, unless F∗ assigns 0 probability 1 to (yF,z(pF)) ∪ (z(pF), 1/ 4), the inequality
above is strict, contradicting the optimality of F∗.H e n c e ,F∗ = FpF.
T oc o n c l u d et h ep r o o fo ft h el e m m a ,n o t et h a ts i n c eyF ∈ y(pF), FpF(yF)=pF and
since z(pF) > 0, FpF(0) = FpF(yF) ≤ pF as desired.
By Lemma 1, there exist a function α : Z → [0,1] such that F
α(s)
s is the unique
solution to
maxD( ˆ F)s u b j e c t t o ˆ F º2 Fs
and F
α(s)
s (0) ≤ α(s). The following lemma shows that α is decreasing; that is, the stronger
a party is, the more it segregates.
Lemma 2: The function α is strictly decreasing.
Proof: In Lemma 1, we showed that α(s)=pFs, yFs ∈ y(pFs,F s)a n d
z(pFs,F s) − φ(yFs)=0
If ˆ s>s ,t h e n
z(pFs,Fˆ s)=z(pFs,F s)+ˆ s − s>z (pFs,F s)
Similarly, yFs +ˆ s − s ∈ y(pFs,Fˆ s)a n dφ(yFs +ˆ s − s) ≤ φ(yFs)s i n c eφ is non-increasing
and ˆ s>s .H e n c e ,
z(pFs,Fˆ s) − φ(yFs +ˆ s − s) > 0
Then, since W is increasing yFˆ s ∈ y(pFˆ s,F ˆ s), and
z(pFˆ s,F ˆ s) − φ(y,Fˆ s)=0
27implies α(s)=pF > ˆ pF = α(ˆ s).
Lemma 3: If ˆ q<q<α (s),t h e nD(F ˆ q
s) ≤ D(Fq
s).











>L ∗(z)w h e n e v e r z<y
= L∗(z)i f z ∈ {y,z(q,F)}
<L ∗(z)i f z ∈ (y,z(q,F))
(1)






































L(z)dF ˆ q(z)=D(F ˆ q)
Note that the inequality above uses the fact that F ˆ q − Fq ≤ 0 for all z<yand
F ˆ q(z(ˆ q,F)) = 1 and y ≤ z(ˆ q,F) ≤ z(q,F).
Symmetric arguments establish that there exist a function β such that ¯ G
β(s)
s :=
ρ[(ρ(G))β(s)] minimizes D(H)a m o n ga l lH º2 G,[ ρ(G)]
β(s)
s (0) ≤ β(s), β is strictly in-
creasing and D( ¯ G
β(s)
s ) ≤ D( ¯ Gq
s) ≤ D( ¯ Gˆ q
s)w h e n e v e rˆ q<q≤ β(s). Henceforth, we will
also refer these symmetric statements as Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
7.1 Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3
Proof of Theorem 1:
By the theorem of the maximum α, β and D(F
α(s)
s ),D( ¯ Gβ(s)) are continuous functions






















s∗ ) is the unique equilibrium.
Since ∆(Hs, ˆ Hs)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi ns for all H, ˆ H (Lemma 1A), party 1’s payoﬀ is
greater than Pr{s>s ∗} if and only if ∆(Hs, ˆ Hs) ≥ 1/ 2.T h es t r a t e g yF
α(s
∗)
s∗ is the unique
strategy that ensures ∆(F
α(s∗)
s∗ , ˆ H) ≥ 1/ 2 for all ˆ H. But since this is a zero sum game, it
follows that F
α(s∗)
s∗ is the unique equilibrium strategy for party 1. Symmetric arguments
establish that G
β(s∗)
s∗ is the unique equilibrium strategy for party 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 and Lemma 2.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :The proof of part (i) was presented in the discussion following the
statement of Theorem 3.
Part (ii): Let s = s(Λ), s1 = s1(Λ), ˆ s = s(ˆ Λ), and ˆ s1 = s1(ˆ Λ). Part (i) implies ˆ s ≥ s ≥ s1
and hence, Lemma 2 implies α(ˆ s) ≤ α(s) ≤ α(s1). Hence, Lemma 3 implies
D(Fα(ˆ s)
s1 ) ≤ D(Fα(s)




s1 )=1/ 2 and therefore D(F
α(ˆ s)
s1 ) ≤ 1/ 2 = D(F
α(ˆ s)
ˆ s1 ). Then, ˆ s1 ≥ s1 as
required.
Part (iii): Since s1 ≤ s ≤ s2,p a r t yi’s seat share at s in territory i is weakly greater than
1/ 2. This implies that the critical state s(F,G,λ)i sw e a k l yd e c r e a s i n gi nλ.
7.2 Proof of Corollary 2
First, we establish that for large n the critical state sn satisﬁes sn ≤−   for some
 >0. To see this, let p =1− 1/(2λ) − η be the redistricting plan for party 1. Note
that p>0 for small η>0 and therefore z(H,p) > 0. Let s = −z(H,p)/2 and note that
Ln(s+ z(H,p)) → 1 and therefore at s party 1’s seat share converges to a number no less
than (1−p)λ =[ 1 /(2λ)+η]λ>1/ 2 and hence for n large, the critical state must be smaller
than s.
Elementary arguments show that φ(y) → 0a sn →∞for any y ∈ [−1/4,0]. Therefore,
s<0a n dn large imply that qn = 0 for large n.
29Since s<0 party 2’s seat share in territory 2 converges to 1 (in the critical state).
Hence, party 1 must win a seat share of 1/(2λ) in the critical state in territory 1. Part (i)
of the corollary now follows from the fact that local uncertainty disappears as n →∞ .
For part (ii) a straightforward calculation shows that s(Λ) ≥ 2λ−1
2λ
1
8. (This bound is
achieved for the 2 point distribution of the example of Section 2.1).
7.3 Proof of Theorems 4-7
Proof of Theorem 4: Any strategy feasible at ˆ Λ =(ˆ H,1,L)i sf e a s i b l ea tΛ =( H,1,L).
Since the games Λ =( H,1,L)a n dˆ Λ =(ˆ H,1,L) do not yield the same equilibrium payoﬀ,
we have s(H,1,L) <s ( ˆ H,1,L). The Theorem then follows since s(H,·,L)i sc o n t i n u o u s .
The proof that s(H,·,L) is continuous is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 3A: Let (p,q) be an equilibrium of the redistricting game Λ =( F,G,λ,L).
Then, p<1/2,q<1/2.
Proof: Let s = s(Λ) be the critical state. Note that
D(Fp
s ) ≤ pL(y(p,Fs)) + (1 − p)L(z(p,Fs)) <p L (y(p,Fs)) + (1 − p)L(−y(p,Fs))
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2A part (ia). For p ≥ 1/2 the symmetry
of L therefore implies D(Fp
s ) < 1/2. But this contradicts Theorem 3 which shows that
s1(Λ) ≤ s(Λ) and hence D(Fp
s ) ≥ 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 5: By Lemma 3A, the optimal strategies satisfy p,q ≤ 1/2a n d
therefore F1/2, ¯ F1/2 are mean preserving spreads the parties’ optimal strategies.
Consider the strategy [ρ(F)]1/2. Since party 2’s supporters are easier to segregate
at F it follows that [ρ(F)]1/2 is a feasible strategy for party 1 and, since [ρ(F)]1/2 is a
mean preserving spread of [ρ(F)]q it follows that [ρ(F)]q is a feasible strategy for party
1. Clearly, if party 1 chooses [ρ(F)]q and party 2 chooses ¯ Fq = ρ([ρ(F)]q)t h e ns(Λ)=0
since the strategies are identical. We conclude that s(F,λ) ≤ 0.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 :Assume λ =1 .L e tp<1/ 2 denote the optimal redistricting plan
for H (assuming π1 = π2). First, we show that the unique continuation equilibrium is
π1 = π2 =1 .
30Note p = 0 implies s(H,1) = 0. It is easy to see that at s = 0 party 1 can guarantee
am a j o r i t y( s i n c eH is non-degenerate, this follows from the symmetry of L and the strict
convexity of L on [−1/4,0].) Therefore, p = 0 cannot be optimal and hence p ∈ (0,1/2)
and s<0.
Deﬁne
δ := π1 − π2 ≥ 0








[L(s + ω(1 + δ)) − L(s + ω)]dHp
+( 1− p)[L(s + z(p,H)(1 + δ)) − L(s + z(p,H))]
Since s<0a n dp ≤ 1/2 it follows that y(p,H) < 0 and therefore the convexity of L
implies for ω ≤ y
L(s + ω(1 + δ)) − L(s + ω) ≥ L(s + y + δω) − L(s + y)
Using Jensen’s inequality we conclude that
I(δ) ≥p[L(s + y + δm(H
p
−)) − L(s + y()]







−)+( 1− p)z(p,F)=0 ,a n d0<z (p,H) <
−m(H) (Lemma 2A, part (ia) and the fact that m(H
p
−) ≤ y(p,H)). Therefore, since L is
symmetric, concave on [0,1/4] and since p<1/ 2 we have
(1 − p)[L(s + z(p,H)(1 + δ))−L(s + z(p,H))]
>p[L(s + y) − L(s + y + δm(H
p
−))]
and therefore I(δ) > 0f o rδ>0 and (by a symmetric argument) I(δ) < 0f o rδ<0.
Hence, party 1 seeks to maximize δ and party 2 seeks to minimize δ. W ec o n c l u d et h a t
π1 = π2 = 1 is the unique continuation equilibrium.
31Next, we show that the p−segregation plan is the unique equilibrium redistricting
plan in the ﬁrst stage. Fix π2 = 1 and note that (since the game is zero sum) this yields
an upper bound to the gains from a possible deviation by party 1. Clearly, if π1 =1t h e n
the deviation cannot be proﬁtable since p is the unique optimal redistricting plan given
π1 = π2 = 1. Assume π1 < 1 and note that the distribution of ω is a mean preserving
spread of the distribution of ω(1 + d)f o rd<0. Therefore, we may apply Theorem 4 to
show that party 1’s payoﬀ must decrease when choosing π1 < 1.
Hence, we have established that the only Nash equilibrium outcome for λ =1i st h e
one described in the theorem. A straightforward continuity argument yields the same
conclusion for λ close to one.
It remains to establish the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In par-
ticular, we must show that for every redistricting plan (F,G) there exists an equilibrium
i nt h ep o l i c yg a m e( i nm i x e ds t r a t e g i e s ) . N o t et h a tap a r t y ’ ss e a ts h a r ei sac o n t i n u o u s
function of the policy and hence we can use a standard argument to show existence of
equilibrium in mixed strategies.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 :Assume party 1 chooses π1 =1a n dpn as in the equilibrium of
Corollary 2. Then, party 1 wins for all s>s n where sn < −  for some  >0. This follows
by an argument identical to the one given in the proof of Corollary 2. We conclude that
s(Πn) < − .
Since s(Πn) < −  the optimal redistricting plan for party 2 is a uniform redistricting
plan qn =0w h e nn is large. The argument is identical to the one given for the same
result in Corollary 2. This implies that the policy choice has no eﬀe c to ns e a ts h a r ei n
territory 2. Therefore, we can apply the argument of the proof of Theorem 6 to show that
π1 = π2 = 1 is the only equilibrium policy choice. The remainder of the Theorem follows
from Corollary 2.
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